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Recently, wireless sensor networks have been used extensively in diﬀerent domains. For example, if the wireless sensor node of a
wireless sensor network is distributed in an insecure area, a secret key must be used to protect the transmission between the sensor
nodes. Most of the existing methods consist of preselecting m keys from a key pool and forming a key chain. Then, the sensor
nodes make use of the key chain to encrypt the data. However, while the secret key is being transmitted, it can easily be exposed
during transmission. We propose a dynamic key management protocol, which can improve the security of the key juxtaposed to
existing methods. Additionally, the dynamic update of the key can lower the probability of the key to being guessed correctly. In
addition, with the new protocol, attacks on the wireless sensor network can be avoided.
Copyright © 2008 C.-L. Chen and C.-T. Li. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The composition and application of
the wireless sensor network
There are four main modules of the wireless sensor network,
including the sensor module, the processor module, the
communication module, and the power module. The major
function of each module is introduced below.
(1) Sensor module: the sensor module is responsible
for sensing an analog signal. The signal transformation
component transforms the analog signal detected by the
sensor module into a digital signal. The data will then be sent
to the processing module for additional work to be done.
(2) Processor module: the processor module includes
a storage component and a processing component. The
function of the storage component is similar to the storage
device in computer. The detected information is kept in
the storage component. The processing module is similar
to the CPU of a PC. It executes the stored programming
code to coordinate and control the diﬀerent components
of the detector. The stored programming command or the
command from the back-end terminal can, through the
processing component, instruct the sensor component to
collect information. After the arrangement of the collected
information, it will be transmitted through the transmission
module.
(3) Communication module: the communication mod-
ule is mainly responsible for communication with other
detectors, or transmission of the collected information to
the base station. The media of the communication module
include infrared rays, radio waves, and optic fibers. There are
diﬀerent options in accordance with various environments
and applications.
(4) Power module: the power supply module is respon-
sible for providing power to all of the components in the
detector. As all operations consume electricity, this is a very
important component. In general, the power of the detector
is provided by a battery. Therefore, conserving electricity is
the main consideration of the software and the hardware
designs.
The general necessary characteristics of wireless sensor
networks include ability for multiple deployments, low cost,
small size, and an adequate battery power supply. The route
transmissions of the wireless sensor network include the
following types.
(1) Cluster: the cluster structure is the most represen-
tative routing protocol. The general practice is to group a
large number of sensors into several clusters. In each of the
clusters, a node is chosen as the cluster head, which collects
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and converges on information from other sensor nodes and
transmits the information to the base station.
(2) Chaining: the chaining structure diﬀers from the
cluster structure. Each detector node in the network is linked
as a chain. In each round, a node in the chaining structure
is chosen as the chaining head. Both ends of the chain then
start transmitting data to adjacent nodes in the direction of
the chaining head. In addition, each receiving node gathers
the information. Finally, the chaining head transmits the
information to the base station.
In recent years, wireless sensor networks have been
used extensively in environmental monitoring, such as the
collection of meteorological information, monitoring of
health information, information gathering, and tracking on
the battlefield. Using a sensor network in an environment
such as a battlefield leaves information insecure. The enemy
can eavesdrop by intercepting information meant to be
transmitted from the sending node to the receiving node.
Therefore, it is necessary to make use of secure transmission
on wireless sensor networks. However, there are obvious
restrictions on the resources of wireless sensor networks.
The restrictions on the CPU are obvious, including memory,
bandwidth, and the consumption of electricity. Therefore,
it is very important to choose a proper encryption system.
Furthermore, there are obvious pitfalls to the hardware of
a wireless sensor node, including high cost and impractical
implementation. Public key algorithms, such as Diﬃe-
Hellman key management [1] or RSA signature [2], are not
in fact feasible.
In this section, we will review the existing key protocols of
wireless sensor networks. We have classified these protocols
into three types: random key predistribution protocols,
group-based key predistribution protocols, and hierarchical
structure protocols.
1.2. Related work
In the past researches, several famous key managements in
wireless sensor network have been proposed. Due to the
previous method, the m sets of keys are selected from the
key pool to form a key chain [3–7], which suﬀer from many
attacks. In this paper, we have proposed a novel scheme for
the generation of a dynamic key management to improve the
previous methods. In this section, we will briefly review and
analyze them.
1.2.1. Random key predistribution protocols
In 2002, Eschenauer and Gligor [4] proposed a random key
predistribution infrastructure. This infrastructure includes
three steps: a key predistribution step, a key sensor and
sharing step, and a path of key establishment step. Before
the deployment of any sensor node, m sets of keys are
selected from a large key pool. The m keys form a key chain
which will be sent to each sensor node. One key is selected
between the nodes, which will later be used to transmit data
among the group. This method is secure. However, each
sensor node must store m keys. This is a problem for the
memory and power consumption of the sensor node. Blom’s
method [8] uses a global matrix pool to replace the global key
pool. In the key predistribution phase, each node randomly
selects several matrices from the global matrices pool, and
then loads a row of elements from each determined matrix
into the node. In this case, any two adjacent nodes have a
row of elements from the same matrix that can establish a
pairwise key. Di Pietro et al. [7] proposed a random key
transmission protocol. The random keys are transmitted
between the sensor nodes so that any two nodes can establish
a communication channel. The shortcoming of this method
is that each sensor node must store more than three sets
of keys. In order to increase the security, the number of
keys must be increased. However, the augmentation of the
number of keys also increases the loading of the sensor nodes.
Furthermore, power consumption is also increased.
1.2.2. Group-based key predistribution protocols
The so-called group key predistribution protocol is used
to divide the area of the nodes into several groups. The
helicopter airdrops the nodes into a predefined area so that
the sensor nodes have a higher probability of communicating
properly.
Liu and Ning [6] proposed a paired key protocol. With
a polynomial key pool and predistribution of a grid key,
this protocol has higher elasticity on catch and attack,
and superior sensor node communication of sensor node.
However, a key algorithm is relatively complicated. More
time is required to generate a key. Though the security
can be improved, it cannot reach the responsiveness and
convenience needed by the sensor network.
1.2.3. Hierarchical structure protocols
The hierarchy predistribution protocols include several
cluster nodes in the base station and sensor nodes. Cluster
nodes have stronger operational ability. Before deployment,
each cluster node stores the keys. After deployment, the
nodes will exchange the codes. At the same time, the cluster
nodes will be informed of the code of the sensor nodes.
Through this method, the whole network can communicate.
However, if one of the nodes is caught, the information
transmitted between the cluster nodes and the sensor nodes
could be easily observed by an enemy. Therefore, the
cluster nodes must increase the number of keys to improve
security. However, the resources of sensor nodes are limited,
making this impracticable. Therefore, Cheng and Agrawal
[3] have proposed a bivalent polynomial. Cheng and Agrawal
presented an improved key distribution mechanism (IKDM)
by which the use of bivariate polynomials developed. Each
gateway does not directly store nodes’ gateway keys, but
each gateway stores bivariate polynomial functions. After
deployment, a node sends its ID code and the gateway
numbers to the nearest gateway. Then, the gateway asks other
gateways to obtain subkeys. The gateway can then compute
the gateway keys of neighboring nodes from these subkeys.
The other related scheme likes Jolly et al. [5] which also based
on the identity-based symmetric keying scheme. This paper
further discusses the addition of sensors issue.
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1.2.4. Other protocols
Chan et al. [9] have proposed two secure protocols. Chan and
Perrig presented peer intermediaries for a key establishment
protocol (PIKE). Each node has an identity of the form
(x, y). A node solely shares a pairwise key with each other
node having the same x-coordinate or y-coordinate. After
deployment, two adjacent nodes possess the pairwise key
if their identities are half matched, or they can route a
key with an intermediary node. For the base station, to
achieve data security and authentication, an eﬃcient key
sharing algorithm must be used. For example, RC5 makes
use of this secure algorithm to ensure authentication and
security. Secondly, in order to ensure the safety of the source
of information, a one-dimension hash chain, such as time
eﬃcient streamed loss-tolerant authentication (TESLA), is
adopted to conduct the authentication of information.
1.3. Environmental requirements
(1) Confidence of data: in general, the wireless sensor
network is deployed a region that people cannot reach, or
in a dangerous area to conduct monitoring and information
collection. An example of such a location would be a
battlefield, where enemy positions are tracked. Therefore,
the information collected by the sensor node must be
accurate and confidential. Additionally, data transmission in
the wireless sensor network is conducted by wireless radio
frequency. When the sensor node transmits confidential
information to the backend server, if there is no security
mechanism to handle the information, the transmitted data
could be exposed easily. Especially, when the information
is transmitted from enemy positions, the process should be
protected by the encryption system. The encryption system
can be classified into two types: symmetric encryption
systems and asymmetrical encryption systems. In symmetric
encryption, the sensor nodes share one conference key for
transmission. In asymmetrical encryption, the public key
is adopted for transmission. However, due to the resource
limitations of the sensor network and high cost, the use of
an asymmetrical has proven impractical.
(2) Data authentication: in the sensor network, each
region may include hundreds or even thousands of sen-
sor nodes. Data transmission between the nodes is very
common. If a hostile node exists, which broadcasts data
constantly, and there is no data authentication between the
sensor nodes, the network will be paralyzed. In addition,
the resource consumption of the nodes will be increased,
which will reduce the lifespan of the sensor node. Therefore,
minimizing rounds of communication and minimizing
rounds of a confirmable dynamic key management are
important topics in sensor networking. The sensor nodes on
the transmission end can share the key to encrypt the data to
be sent. The sensor nodes on the receiving end can also share
the same key to decrypt.
(3) Man-in-the-middle attack [10]: the so-called man-
in-the-middle attack occurs when data is intercepted by a
hostile node. During data transmission between the sensor
nodes and cluster nodes, or cluster nodes and base station,
the transmission is intercepted by the hostile node. The data
transmitted by the sensor nodes is falsified and is resent
again. The data received by the receiving nodes is thus not the
original data to be transmitted. Therefore, the data received
by the base station is not correct, and it must be solved by
encryption mechanism.
(4) Replay attack [11]: the replay attack occurs when
there is a hostile node among the sensor nodes of the region
that wants to get the key. Packets are constantly resent in an
attempt to obtain the key between the sensor nodes. Once the
key is obtained, further attacks can be conducted. In order to
solve this type of attack, we synchronize transmission times
between the receiving end and the sending end. The time
diﬀerence between transmission and reception can be used
to determine whether the packet is acceptable; otherwise it
can be abandoned.
(5) Memory limitation: with the limitation of the size
of the sensor node, the memory capacity is also limited.
The memory capacity of each sensor node is usually around
dozens of MB. When the security of the wireless sensor
network is enhanced, the memory capacity of the sensor
node should also be considered.
(6) Computation limitation: the CPU is fixed in the
sensor node to handle and calculate the data. However,
limiting size and power consumption only allows for a low-
end CPU model. For example, the StrongARM [12] from
Intel and ATmega [13] from ATmel are the CPU commonly
used.
On the basis of the one-way hash function, exclusive or
operation and symmetric encryption, we have proposed a
method to generate a dynamic key. Each time the sensor
node transmits data, a new key will be generated through
the previous two old keys. The new key will be used
for encryption. When this sensor node transmits data the
following time, the operation will be based on the new
generated key and one of the old keys. These two keys become
the key for this transmission. Other sensor nodes make use
of the same method. When the sensor node transmits data to
a cluster node, the cluster node will request the key of that
sensor node from the base station. Since the base station has
the two primary keys from all sensor nodes, it will transmit
the required key of that sensor node to the cluster node. After
receiving the key, the cluster node can begin decryption.
When the number of sets of the received data is larger than a
threshold value t, the data will be encrypted and transmitted
to the base station. The method of generating the key is the
same as with sensor nodes in order to ensure the accuracy
of the information. In addition, one of the keys between the
base station and cluster nodes, and one between the base
station and the sensor nodes will be updated dynamically in
order to improve the security of the network.
2. DETAILS OF THIS PROTOCOL
2.1. Notation
In this infrastructure, some abbreviations are used. These
symbols and their corresponding meanings are listed as
Table 1.
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Table 1: Notation.
h() Use for the one-way hash function of key
generation
aj , aj−1
Two parameters for generation of key
pre-deployed in the jth sensor node
msgfinish
Message for the cluster node informing sensor
node to update the key
Ksi The ith of the key of the sensor node
Kci The ith of the key of the cluster node
Kmsg
The key used for encryption or decryption of
the msgfinish
Seed The seed for updating the key pre-deployed in
each of the sensor nodes
IDsi The identity of the ith sensor node
IDlist
The identity set list of the t sensor nodes
received from the cluster nodes, such as
IDlist = (IDs1, IDs2, . . . , IDst)
Klist
The key of the sensor nodes needed by the
cluster node, such as Klist = (Ks1,Ks2, . . . ,Kst)
Mi
The plain text information generated by the ith
sensor node
Mf
The latest information received by the base
station
SRNDi The ith nonce is generated by sensor node
CRNDi The ith nonce is generated by node
BRNDi The ith nonce is generated by base station
E(M,K) The symmetric encryption of the
infrastructure makes use of key K to encrypt M
D(M,K) The symmetric decryption of the
infrastructure makes use of key K to decrypt M
A ∼= B Compare whether A is equal to B or not
2.2. Environmental conditions
(1) In the wireless sensor network, we will make use of
cluster management for transmission of data. In general, we
will deploy hundreds or even thousands of sensor nodes in
a wireless sensor network. Additionally, we will divide the
deployed sensor nodes into diﬀerent regions so that each
sensor node can transmit data in the eﬀective range.
(2) In each of the regions, a sensor node will be chosen
automatically as the cluster node. We will use an algorithm to
choose the cluster node, for example, Park and Corson [14],
Perkins and Royer [15], Johnson and Maltz [16]. When the
sensor node transmits the collected data to the backend base
station, the encrypted data will be sent to cluster node. Once
the cluster node has received a certain amount of packets, the
data will be arranged, encrypted, and then transmitted to the
backend base station. Figure 1 is the diagram of transmission
paths of sensor nodes.
(3) After the first deployment of the sensor network, the
cluster nodes will be chosen. The sensor nodes will broadcast
to the cluster nodes so that each cluster node knows the
number of sensor nodes in the specific region. The cluster





Figure 1: Transmission paths of the sensor network.
(4) Once each of the sensor nodes is dispatched from the
factory, we will preset two parameters, such as ai and ai−1.
Also a new key will be generated by a one-way hash function,
for which the key will be used to communicate with the
cluster node. If the sensor node is chosen as a cluster node,
the parameters ai and ai−1 will also be used to generate the
session key for communicating with the base station.
(5) Each sensor node will preset a message key Kmsg and
a seed for updating the key in order to encrypt/decrypt the
message informing the sensor nodes for the update of sensor
nodes. The hash function will be used to update the key of a
message in each round so that the sensor nodes can receive
the secure message for the update of a key.
(6) For data transmission between the nodes, we make
use of jumping transmission. When the first level sensor
nodes have collected data, the encrypted data, together with
the code of the nodes, will be transmitted to the second-
level sensor nodes. The second-level sensor nodes will also
encrypt the collected data. Together with the data received
from the first-level sensor node and the codes of the nodes,
the data will be transmitted to the next level of sensor nodes
and so on. Once the cluster node receives a series of data
from the codes of the sensor nodes, it knows which sensor
nodes have transmitted data to it. According to the codes of
the sensor nodes, the cluster node can request the key list
from the sensor nodes of the base station.
(7) When a sensor node cannot transmit data to cluster
nodes in period time. The base station determines the sensor
node lost. It is possible that the sensor node lost power or
was captured. The user can use the added new node protocol
to join the wireless sensor networks, the whole network can
work normally, see Figure 3.
2.3. Key generation protocol
In our secure protocol, dynamic key management mecha-
nism has been proposed. Two keys are preset in each sensor
node. The new key for the next round is generated by these
two keys. Two keys will also be preset in the cluster node. The
generation of the session key will be the same as those in the
sensor node.
We have divided the mentioned protocol into the follow-
ing five steps, as shown in Figure 2.
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Base station Cluster node Sensor node
1.1 Ksi = h(aj , aj−1)
1.2 K ′msg = h(Kmsg, Seed)
1.3 Csi = E((Mi,K ′msg, IDs j , SRNDi),Ksi)
2.1 Kci = h(aj , aj−1)
2.2 Cci = E((IDlist, IDc j , CRNDi),Kci)
3.1 D(Cci,Kci) = (IDlist, IDc j , CRNDi)
3.2 Cb = E((IDB j ,Klist, CRNDi, BRNDi),Kci)
4.1 D(Cb ,Kci) = (Klist, CRNDi, BRNDi)
4.2 Step 2.2 CRNDi ∼= step 4.1 CRNDi
4.3 D(Csi,Ksi) = (Mi,K ′msg, IDs j , SRNDi)
4.4 Mf = (M1 + M2, . . . , +Mt)/t
4.5 C′ci = E((Mf , BRNDi, IDc j),Kci)
4.6 Cm = E((msgfinish, , SRNDi),K ′msg)
4.7 Update K ′ci = h(Kci, aj)
6.1 D(Cm,K ′msg) = (msgfinish, SRNDi)
6.2 Step 1.3 SRNDi ∼= step 6.1 SRNDi
6.3 Update K ′si
6.4 K ′si = h(Ksi, aj)
6.5 K ′′msg = h(K ′msg,Kmsg)
6.6 C′si = E((M′ i,K ′′msg, IDs j , SRNDi+1),K ′si)
5.1 D(C′ci,Kci) = (Mf , BRNDi, IDc j)
5.2 Step 3.2 BRNDi ∼= step 5.1 BRNDi
5.3 Update K ′si and K ′ci
K ′si = h(Ksi, aj)
K ′ci = h(Kci, aj)
1.4 (Csi, IDs j)
2.3 (Cci, IDc j)
3.3 (Cb , , IDB j)
4.8 (C′ci, IDci)
4.9 Cm
Figure 2: Key generation communication protocol. Note: in Figure 2 scenarios, we present in ith round; jth node identification.
Base station Cluster node Sensor node
1.1 Asi = E((IDs j , aj ,Kmsg, ),Ksi)
1.2 (Asi, IDs j)
2.1 Aci = E((Asi, IDs j , IDc j),Kci)2.2 (Aci, IDc j)
3.1 D(Aci,Kci) = (Asi, IDs j , IDc j)
3.2 ABS = E((IDs j , accept, round),Ksi)
3.3 (ABS, IDs j , IDB j)
4 (ABS, IDC j)
5 D(ABS,Ksi) = (IDs j , Accept, Round)
Figure 3: Add new node protocol.
Step 1. When the deployed sensor node i returns the
collected information, the sensor node will make use of the






Further, the two parameters Kmsg and the Seed preset in each
of the nodes will use the hash function to generate a new
message key, K ′msg, where





At that moment, the sensor node will make use of Ksi to
encrypt the detected data Mi and the preset K ′msg, IDs j , and
SRNDi. A complete packet Csi will be generated as follows:
Csi = E
((





The (Csi, IDs j) is then transmitted to the cluster node.
Step 2. When the cluster node receives more than t packets,
or when the period is longer than a specific time, the cluster
node will record and transmit the identity, IDs j , of the sensor
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node. It will also arrange a list, IDlist, according to the codes
of the received sensor nodes so that
IDlist =
(
IDs1, IDs2, . . . , IDst
)
. (4)
The cluster node will also make use of the two preset






At that moment, the cluster node will make use of Kci to









Together, with the code IDc j of the cluster node, it will be
transmitted to the base station.
Step 3. When the base station receives the packet from the
cluster node, it will confirm the code, IDc j , of the cluster
node and seek the key, Kci, of that cluster node in the code





) = (IDlist, CRNDi
)
. (7)
The base station will receive the IDlist sent from the cluster
node. If this accords with the list, it will search for the key
of the corresponding sensor node from the database and
arrange them into the key list, Klist, where
Klist =
(
Ks1,Ks2, . . . ,Kst
)
. (8)
At that moment, the base station will make use of Kci to
encrypt (IDB j ,Klist, CRNDi, BRNDi). The encrypted data,










Step 4. When the cluster node receives the returned data
from the base station, it will make use of the key, Kci,




) = (IDB j ,Klist, CRNDi, BRNDi
)
. (10)
The cluster node compares the CRNDi in (6) whether equal
to the CRNDi in (10).
If it is true, the cluster node only can use the Ksi from Klist
so that it knows the key of the node that transmitted the data.




) = (Mi,K ′msg, IDs j , SRNDi
)
(11)
returned from the sensor node can be obtained. The cluster
node will calculate the average value of each set of data and
obtain Mf , where
Mf =
(




This ensures the data is accurate when it is transmitted to
backend. This cluster node will make use of Kci to encrypt
Mf and nonce BRNDi as a complete packet, C′ci, where
C′ci = E
((





Together with the code, IDc j , of the cluster node, it is
transmitted to the base station.
At that moment, the cluster node will update the session
key





for the next round.
Moreover, the cluster node will make use of the key,
K ′msg, transmitted from the sensor node to encrypt the








The encrypted packet, Cm, will then be broadcasted to the
sensor nodes, and the sensor nodes will be informed of the
completion of message transmission.
Step 5. When the base station receives the packet from the
cluster node, it will confirm the identity, IDc j , of the cluster
node first. Also, it will search for the key, Kci, of the cluster
node from the database according to the code of the cluster




) = (Mf , BRNDi
)
. (16)
The base station compares the BRNDi in (9) whether equal to
the BRNDi in (16). If it is true, the base station only convince
the received information, Mf , transmitted from the cluster
node. Simultaneously, the base station will update the key of
the cluster node and sensor node, which will be updated to
K ′si and K ′ci, where











Step 6. After receiving the message Cm, the sensor node will
make use of K ′msg for decryption, and obtain the message






)) = (msgfinish, SRNDi
)
. (18)
The sensor node compares the SRNDi in (3) whether equal
to the SRNDi in (18). If it is true, the key will then be
replaced. The previously generated keys, Ksi and aj , are used
to generate a new key, K ′si, where





The next time the data is returned, the K ′si will be adopted
to encrypt the transmitted data. When the sensor node
transmits the data in the second round, the original message
key, K ′msg, will be updated to K ′′msg, where
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The message key, K ′′msg, together with the message M′i, the













When the sensor node transmits data for the third time, the
message key must be updated to K ′′′msg, where





The updated message key, together with K ′′′msg, and the
message M′′i, the sensor node makes use of K ′′′si to encrypt













The session keys Ksi, K ′si, and K ′′si are for encrypted
message between the cluster node and sensor node. In
addition, the updated K ′′msg and K ′′′msg are the message
keys for the cluster node transmitting complete messages
msgfinish, to the sensor node during the second and third
rounds.
2.4. Add new node protocol
If the base station cannot obtain the messages from the
sensor nodes in a specific period (the sensor node could be
power down or captured by adversary), the new sensor node
should be redeployed, and the protocol will be executed. The
scenarios are shown in Figure 3.
Step 1. When a new sensor node is joined to the wireless
sensor networks, the sensor node make use of Ksi to encrypt
the preset parameters aj and Kmsg with the IDs j of the sensor
node; a complete packet, Asi, is generated as follows:
Asi = E
((





The (Asi, IDs j) is then transmitted to the cluster node.
Step 2. The cluster node receives the request packet from the
sensor node, which will make use of the key, Kci, to encrypt
the packet, Asi; the code, IDsi, of the sensor node; and the
code, IDci, of the cluster node
Aci = E
((





Together with the code, IDsi, of the node, it will be transmit-
ted to the base station as a complete packet (Aci, IDc j).
Step 3. The base station will receive the packet from the
cluster node, and it will make use of the key, Kci, to decrypt




) = (Asi, IDs j , IDc j
)
. (26)
The base station can confirm the aj and Kmsg, if it is not
true, the cluster node will abandon this packet. Otherwise,
the base station will make use of the key, Kci, to encrypt the









Together with the codes IDsi and IDBi, it will be transmitted
to the cluster node as a complete packet, (ABS, IDs j , IDB j),
and send to cluster node.
Step 4. The cluster node receives the data from the base
station so that it can confirm the code, IDB j , of the base
station. If it is not true, the cluster node will abandon this
packet. Otherwise, the cluster node can broadcast (ABS, IDC j)
to the sensor nodes.
Step 5. After the sensor node receives the packet, it can use




) = (IDs j , Accept, Round
)
. (28)
According to the Round, the sensor node will calculate the
communication key of the wireless sensor network.
3. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE
3.1. Analysis of security
3.1.1. Dynamic key management
Regarding the generation of a key, the previous predeploy-
ment has been changed. M sets of keys from the key pool
used to generate a key chain will no longer be chosen. The
communication between any two nodes will make use of
these m sets of keys to negotiate and communicate. In our
infrastructure, for each data transmission, a new key will be
generated from the previous two keys. For example, if the
key is Ksi = h(ai, ai−1) for the first transmission, K ′si =
h(Ksi, ai) for the second transmission, and K ′′si = h(K ′si,Ksi)
for the third transmission, and so on. This reduces the
possibility of the attacker correctly guessing the key from
the key chain and using it repeatedly. This also improves the
security of the network. In addition, the cluster node makes
use of similar dynamic key generation when it transmits a
complete message. The predeployed Kmsg and Seed are used
for operation, where K ′msg = h(Kmsg, Seed) is the message
key. The message key in the second round will be updated to
K ′′msg = h(K ′msg,Kmsg), and so on. The attacker is not able
to imitate the cluster node to transmit a complete message
key to update the key.
3.1.2. Prevention of malicious guessing attacks
When the deployed sensor network exists for a certain
period, the key and the database of the base station will be
updated so that the attacker cannot have current knowledge
pertaining to the key. Furthermore, each node includes the
records of not more than three keys, two old keys and one
newly generated key. When the new key is generated, the
oldest key will be updated. This can improve the security of
the network and reduce the memory load of the nodes.
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Table 2: The performance analysis of key generation communica-
tion protocol.
Relationship between the nodes Rounds Time complexity
Sensor node and cluster node 2 2TE + 1TM
Cluster node and base station 3 3TE + 3TM
TE : the time complexity of using symmetric encryption algorithm.
TM : the time complexity needed for plaintext (e.g., IDs j , IDc j , IDB j)
transmission.
Table 3: The performance analysis of add new node protocol.
Relationship between the nodes Rounds Time complexity
Sensor node and cluster node 2 2TE + 2TM
Cluster node and base station 2 2TE + 3TM
TE : the time complexity of using symmetric encryption algorithm.
TM : the time complexity needed for plaintext (e.g., IDs j , IDc j , IDB j)
transmission.
3.1.3. Prevention of replay attacks
In each of the communication sessions, including the sensor
node to the cluster node or the cluster node to the base
station, the “two-way” authentication has been adopted to
prevent the replaying attack. We use the nonce to confirm
each communication message. The related descriptions are
shown in step 4.2, 5.2, and 6.2 of Figure 2. Therefore, our
scheme can prevent the replaying attacks.
3.1.4. Prevention of the falsification attack
For the transmission between the cluster node and
sensor node, we adopt key Ksi for encryption. When
the sensor node returns the data to the cluster node,
E((Mi,K ′msg, IDs j , SRNDi),Ksi) is adopted for encryption.
When the communication between the cluster node and
the base station is finished, the Klist is obtained. The base
station returns the Ksi to the cluster node and the decryption
can occur. If the received key cannot decrypt the received
encrypted packet, it will be regarded as an illegal packet and
will be abandoned. This practice can ensure the integrity of
the data transmission, and guarantee the data is sent from
the sensor node administrated by the cluster node.
3.1.5. Prevention of man-in-the-middle-attacks and
guarantee of data privacy
When the sensor node communicates with the cluster
node, the encryption mechanism is adopted to prevent the
attack and ensure data privacy. The transmission message is
encrypted into
Csi = E((Mi,K ′msg, IDs j , SRNDi),Ksi). The cluster node
and the base station also adopt a similar method to prevent
attacks and ensure data privacy. For example,
(1) key generation communication protocol:
Cci = E((IDlist, IDc j , CRNDi),Kci),
Cb = E((IDB j ,Klist, CRNDi, BRNDi),Kci),
C′ci = E((Mf , BRNDi, IDc j),Kci), and
Cm = E((msgfinish, SRNDi),K ′msg).
(2) Add new node protocol:
Asi = E((IDs j , aj ,Kmsg),Ksi),
Aci = E((Asi, IDs j , IDc j),Kci),
ABS = E((IDs j , Accept, Round),Ksi).
Therefore, the attacker cannot obtain the protected data.
Furthermore, the cluster node makes use of Kmsg to encrypt
the complete message and the message key will be updated
each round. Therefore, the attacker cannot imitate the cluster
node to transmit a message. The man-in-the-middle-attack
can thus be prevented.
3.1.6. The node captured attack analysis
For transmission between the cluster node and sensor node,
we adopt key Ksi for encryption. We make use of the one way
hash function to generate the key. Because the one way hash
function can prevent the attacker from inversing the key. (1)
H(x) is relatively easy to compute for any given x making
both hardware and software implementations practical. (2)
For any given value h, it is computationally infeasible to
find x such that H(x) = h. This is sometimes referred to
in the literature as the one-way property. (3) For any given
block x, it is computationally infeasible to find y /=x with
H(y) = H(x). This is sometimes referred to as weak collision
resistance.
3.2. Performance analysis
In Tables 2 and 3, we analyze the performance of key
generation communication protocol and add new node
protocol, respectively.
3.3. Comparison
We make a comparison with the related sensor network in
Table 4.
4. CONCLUSION
Due to the previous method, the m sets of keys are selected
from the key pool to form a key chain, which involves
many shortcomings. In this paper, we have proposed the
infrastructure for generation of a dynamic key capable of
supplanting previous methods. Through dynamic key gen-
eration management, the infrastructure we have proposed
includes the following contributions.
(1) Due to the limitations of wireless sensor network,
such as a limited power source and scarce memory,
we adopt batch communication method to reduce
the power consumption of the sensor node. In
addition, our method requires each node to record
not more than three keys and it is not necessary
to record the complete key chain. This method can
conserve the memory of the sensor node significantly.
C.-L. Chen and C.-T. Li 9
Table 4: The comparison of the related sensor network.
Protocol Our scheme IKDM [3] LEKM [5]
Captured attack analysis Yes Yes N/A
Add new node algorithm Yes N/A Yes


























+ (m− 1) + 1
The time cost of Sensor node Specific: (2th + 2tu) N/A N/A
key computation Cluster node Specific: (th + tU)
(n× tpoly × l)
m
N/A
m: number of the cluster nodes in sensor networks; n: number of the sensor nodes in cluster.
l: times of the cluster division; tpoly: time cost of polynomial function.
th: time cost of key generation; tU : time cost of key update.
(2) The key for each transmission will only be used
once. In the next transmission, another key will be
used. This method can reduce the probability of the
attacker guessing the key correctly and can improve
security.
(3) For transmission, we make use of the “two-
way” authentication in the process of transmission.
Through the comparison nonce of the receiving end
and the sending end, the replaying attacks can be
prevented.
Regarding the application of the wireless sensor, the
infrastructure we have proposed can be used in military
situations, such as monitoring the enemy on the battlefield.
The cluster node will conduct statistical calculations of the
received data from the sensor nodes, and the data is then
transmitted to the base station. This can ensure that the
information received by the base station is accurate. This
can also be applied in weather forecasting. Calculations
from the cluster node can increase the accuracy of detected
temperature and humidity. In the future, we will implement
this prototype in the real environment and prove it is
realistic.
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